Microsoft seizes phishing kits behind 1 billion messages this year
A Florida court order let Microsoft take over the domains. Its threat report shows how one group took over Microsoft 365 tenants and resold them to phishers.
Towfiqu barbhuiya / UnsplashMicrosoft said on October 14 that it had taken control of the web domains behind three Chinese-language crime services: YAM Store, CoGUI and Iron Man. On October 7 a federal court in the Southern District of Florida issued a temporary restraining order, sought by Microsoft and Health-ISAC, the health sector's threat-sharing group, that let them seize and redirect the domains. Microsoft says the services were used to send more than 1 billion phishing emails and text messages since January, aimed at more than 75,000 organizations.
The scale is one reason this matters to IT teams. The method is the other. Microsoft's threat report says YAM Store took over real Microsoft 365 tenants, gave itself admin rights and rented the tenants out, so the phishing was sent and hosted from inside Microsoft's own cloud.
Three services, one supply chain
Microsoft tracks the kit developers as Storm-2990 and the YAM Store operators as Storm-3119.
CoGUI sold ready-made fake websites and text messages copying banks, government offices and tech brands. The Record reports that Japan was its main target until criminals moved to Iron Man in mid-2026.
Iron Man offered more than 2,335 page templates covering over 139 countries, from parking fine notices to bank logins, according to Microsoft. Operators watched victims in real time and chose what page they saw next. Stolen passwords, card numbers and one-time codes arrived through Telegram bots.
YAM Store was the access shop. It sold compromised or fake Microsoft and Google accounts, Microsoft 365 licenses and storage.
Microsoft describes how Storm-3119 worked. It scanned for Microsoft 365 tenants over Tor, used stolen app credentials to reset passwords quietly, reached Global Administrator, then created a service principal with wide Microsoft Graph and SharePoint permissions. SharePoint and OneDrive then hosted phishing content. The group also built fake company websites, probably with AI-written text, so the tenants looked like real businesses.
Victims lost more than passwords. Microsoft says the kits were used for device code phishing, where a user is tricked into entering a code that hands an attacker a sign-in token, and for card fraud. Targets included health care, financial services, wholesale distribution and IT, mostly in Japan, the US, Australia and India.
What the takedown did
Microsoft says it disabled more than 20,000 accounts tied to YAM Store, is blocking over 100,000 impersonation domains and is removing infrastructure hosted on its own cloud. Japan's National Police Agency, which tipped Microsoft off in late 2025, took part, along with Proofpoint, Resecurity, TRM Labs, Cloudflare and Oracle. No arrests have been announced.
Of the 1 billion messages, more than 750 million were aimed at Microsoft customers, Cybersecurity Dive reports. Steven Masada, who runs Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit, told CyberScoop that blocking one service only makes room for another, and that the businesses selling these tools are the real target.
What IT teams should do
- Review who holds Global Administrator in each Microsoft 365 tenant, and require phishing-resistant MFA (passkeys or FIDO2 keys) for every one of them.
- Audit service principals and app registrations created in the last six months, especially any with broad Graph or SharePoint permissions you did not approve.
- Block or limit the device code sign-in flow with Conditional Access unless a team has a real need for it.
- Restrict MFA and passkey registration to trusted devices and locations, so a stolen password cannot be used to enroll an attacker's phone.
- Turn on Safe Links for internal mail as well as external, since this campaign sent phishing from inside real tenants.
- Remind staff to confirm urgent payment or login requests through a known channel. Our identity and access management guide and incident response steps cover the follow-up.
Sources
- Microsoft Security Blog: The hidden network: Inside the phishing infrastructure ecosystem powering global cybercrime
- Microsoft On the Issues: Disrupting the service economy behind transnational cybercrime operations
- Cybersecurity Dive: Microsoft, Health-ISAC and partners take down popular phishing kit services
- CyberScoop: Microsoft and partners disrupt vast Chinese-language phishing kit ecosystem
- The Record: Microsoft takes down 3 major phishing platforms used by Chinese cybercriminals